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For a game with positive profit, the optimal proportion of investment
required to continue investing without borrowing is uniquely determined
by an integral equation for each price. For a game with parallel
translated profit, the ratio of the optimal proportion of investment
to its price has some invariance properties. The optimal price of
a game with parallel translated profit converges to its expectation
divided by e to the riskless interest rate for a certain period.
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1. Introduction
A game (a(x), F (x)) would imply that if the investor invests 1 dollar, then he or
she receives a(x) dollars (including the 1 dollar initially invested) in accordance
with a distribution function F (x) that is defined on an interval I ⊆ (−∞, ∞) such
that
∫
I d(F (x)) = 1. For each positive price, in order to continue investing without
borrowing, the optimal proportion of investment must be in (0, 1] (see [4,5,6,7]).
In Section 2, we will investigate a game with parallel translated profit (a(x) + n,
F (x)).
For simplicity, we will omit the currency notation. It is assumed that the
profit function a(x) is measurable and non constant (a.e.) with respect to F (x).
In the absence of confusion, we use dF to represent d(F (x)) and employ the
following notation: E :=
∫
I
a(x)dF, H :=
∫
I
1/a(x)dF, ξ := ess infx∈I a(x),
Hξ :=
∫
I
1/(a(x) − ξ)dF . In this paper, we always assume that ξ > 0. If∫
a(x)=ξ dF > 0, we define Hξ = ∞ and 1/Hξ = 0. Since a(x) is non-constant,
we have ξ ≤ ξ + 1/Hξ < 1/H < E (see [4, Section 2 and Lemma 3.5]).
For each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, E), the pre-optimal proportion t˜u ∈ (0, u/(u− ξ)) is
uniquely determined by the equation
∫
I
(a(x)−u)/(a(x)t˜u−ut˜u+u)dF = 0 (see [4,
Section 3]). t˜u has the following properties: (1) t˜u is strictly decreasing ([4, Lemma
3.6]); (2) limu→E− t˜u = 0 ([4, Lemma 3.7]); (3) t˜1/H = 1 ([4, Lemma 3.8]); and (4)
limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u = 1 + ξHξ ([4, Lemma 3.9]).
For each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, E) and t ∈ (0, u/(u − ξ)), the pre-growth rate
G˜u(t) is defined by exp
(∫
I log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1)dF )
)
(see [4, Section 4 ]). We
always assume that G˜ < ∞, which implies that ∫
a(x)>1
log a(x)dF < +∞ (see
[4, Lemma 4.3]). G˜u(t˜u) has the following properties: (1) G˜u(t˜u) is continuous and
strictly decreasing ([4, Lemma 4.9 and Theorem 4.1]); (2) limu→E− G˜u(t˜u) = 1 ([4,
Lemma 4.13]); (3) G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = H exp
(∫
I log a(x)dF
)
([4, Lemma 4.21]); and (4)
limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ G˜u(t˜u) = Hξ exp(
∫
I log (a(x)− ξ) dF ) ([4, Lemmas 3.9 and 4.20]).
1
2We cite the following lemmas (for the proofs see [4, Section 5]):
Lemma 1.1 [4, Corollary 5.1]. For each u ∈ (1/H, E), the optimal proportion of
investment is equal to t˜u, and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is
equal to G˜u(t˜u).
Lemma 1.2 [4, Corollary 5.3]. For each u ∈ (0, 1/H ], the optimal proportion of
investment is equal to 1, and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is
equal to exp(
∫
I
log a(x) dF )/u.
If the riskless continuously compounded interest rate r > 0 for a period is given,
the optimal price of a game can be uniquely determined by the equation such that
the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is equal to er (see [4, Section
6]).
2. Parallel translated profit
For a game with parallel translated profit (a(x) + n, F (x)) (n > −ξ), we use
underlined notations such as a(x) = a(x) + n, E = E + n, H =
∫
I 1/a(x)dF,
ξ = ξ + n and Hξ =
∫
I
1/
(
a(x)− ξ) dF .
Example 1. Suppose that the profit a or b (0 < b < a) occurs with the probability
p or 1− p (0 < p < 1), respectively. From
∫
I
(a(x) + n)− (u+ n)
(a(x) + n)˜tu+n − (u+ n)˜tu+n + u+ n
dF
=
a− u
(a− u)˜tu+n + u+ n
p+
b− u
(b− u)˜tu+n + u+ n
(1− p) = 0, (2.1)
we have t˜u+n = (E − u)(n + u)/((a− u)(u − b)) (b < u < E < a, −b < n). Thus,
we obtain
G˜u+n (˜tu+n) = exp
(∫
I
log
(
(a(x) + n)˜tu+n
u+ n
− t˜u+n + 1
)
dF
)
= (a− b)
(
p
u− b
)p(
1− p
a− u
)1−p
, (2.2)
which is independent of n.
Lemma 2.1. G˜ < +∞, if and only if G˜ < +∞.
Proof. If G˜ < +∞, then from ∫
a(x)+n>1
log(a(x)+n)dF =
∫
1−n<a(x)≤|n|+1
log(a(x)+
n)dF +
∫
a(x)>|n|+1 log(a(x) + n)dF ≤ log(2|n|+ 1)+ log 2+
∫
a(x)>1 log a(x)dF , we
have G˜ < +∞. The remaining can be verified in a similar manner. 
Theorem 2.2. t˜u+n/(u+n) = t˜u/u (u ∈ (ξ+1/Hξ, E)) is independent of n > −ξ.
3Proof. By definition, we have
∫
I
(a(x)− u) / ((a(x) − u)˜tu+n + u+ n) dF = 0,
which is equivalent to
∫
I
(u+ n) /
(
(a(x) − u)˜tu+n + u+ n
)
dF = 1. By differentiating
them, we obtain
∂t˜u+n
∂n
= −
∫
I
a(x)−u
((a(x)−u)etu+n+u+n)
2 dF∫
I
(a(x)−u)2
((a(x)−u)etu+n+u+n)
2 dF
, (2.3)
(˜tu+n − (u + n)
∂t˜u+n
∂n
)
∫
I
a(x)− u(
(a(x) − u)˜tu+n + u+ n
)2 dF = 0. (2.4)
Since these functions are analytic with respect to u (see [4, Lemma 3.1] and
[8, Chapter VIII]), we have ∂t˜u+n/∂n −t˜u+n/(u + n) = 0 or ∂t˜u+n/∂n = 0
as a constant function. If ∂t˜u+n/∂n = t˜u+n/(u + n), then ∂
(˜
tu+n/(u+ n)
)
/∂n
=
(
(u+ n)∂t˜u+n/∂n− t˜u+n
)
/(u+ n)2 = 0, which implies t˜u+n/(u+ n) = t˜u/u. If
∂t˜u+n/∂n = 0, then t˜u+n = t˜u, particularly, t˜1/H+n = t˜1/H . Since t˜1/H+n = t˜1/H =
1 = t˜1/H and t˜u+n is strictly decreasing with respect to u, we have 1/H = 1/H+n,
which contradicts the fact that 1/H−n is strictly increasing with respect to n (see
[5, the proof of Lemma 1.1]). 
Theorem 2.3. G˜u+n (˜tu+n) = G˜u(t˜u) (u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, E)) is independent of
n > −ξ.
Proof. By differentiating G˜u+n(˜tu+n), we have
∂
∂n
G˜u+n(˜tu+n) =
(
∂t˜u+n
∂n
− t˜u+n
u+ n
)
G˜u+n(˜tu+n)
∫
I
a(x)− u
(a(x) − u)˜tu+n + u+ n
dF.
(2.5)
Therefore, the conclusion is obtained form the proof of Theorem 2.2. 
It should be noted that the difference E − (ξ + 1/Hξ) = E − (ξ + 1/Hξ) is
independent of n.
Lemma 2.4. If E <∞, limn→∞ (E − 1/H) = 0.
Proof. By definition, we have
E − 1/H = E + n− 1∫
I
1
a(x)+ndF
= E −
(
1∫
I
1
a(x)+ndF
− n
)
(n > −ξ). (2.6)
Thus, using [5, Lemma 1.1], we derive the conclusion. 
Lemma 2.5. limn→∞ G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = 1.
Proof. The conclusion is derived from the fact that G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = H exp
(∫
I
log (a(x) + n) dF
)
,
limn→∞ nH = limn→∞
∫
I n/(a(x) + n)dF = 1, and
lim
n→∞
exp
(∫
I
log (a(x) + n) dF
)
n
= lim
n→∞
exp
(∫
I
log
(
a(x)
n
+ 1
)
dF
)
= 1.
(2.7)
4
Let r > 0 be the riskless continuously compounded interest rate such that
er < G˜1/H(1). The optimal price ur ∈ (1/H , E) of a game (a(x), F (x)) is then
uniquely determined by the equation er = G˜ur (t˜ur ) (see Lemma 1.1 and [4, Section
6]).
Theorem 2.6. ur = ur + n, if e
r < min(G˜1/H (1), G˜1/H(1)) and n > −ξ.
Proof. By definition we have G˜ur (t˜ur ) = G˜ur (˜tur) = e
r. From Theorem 2.3, we
observe that G˜ur+n(˜tur+n) = G˜ur (t˜ur ). Based on the uniqueness of price ur, we
obtain ur = ur + n. 
Theorem 2.7. If E <∞, limn→∞ ur/E = 1/er.
Proof. From limn→∞ G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = 1 (Lemma 2.5), for each sufficiently large n,
we have er > G˜1/H(1). In this case, the price ur < 1/H is uniquely determined by
the equation er = exp(
∫
I log (a(x) + n)dF )/ur (see Lemma 1.2 and [4, Section 6]).
Thus, we obtain
lim
n→∞
ur
E
= lim
n→∞
(
exp
(∫
I
log
(
a(x)
n
+ 1
)
dF
)
× n
E + n
)
1
er
=
1
er
. 
Example 2. Suppose that the profit 1 or 19 occurs with each probability 1/2.
Then, using Example 1, we have E = 10, H = 10/19, ξ = 1, Hξ =∞, E = 10 + n,
H = (n+10)/((n+1) (n+19)), G˜u+n (˜tu+n) = 9/
√
(u − 1)(19− u), G˜1/H(t˜1/H) =
(n+ 10)/
√
(n+ 1)(n+ 19), n > −1, and 1 < u < 10.
Let the riskless continuously compounded interest rate r be 0.05. Then, as
er ; 1.051 < G˜1/H(1) ; 2.294, the equation e
r = 9/
√
(u− 1)(19− u) deduces the
optimal price ur = 10 − 9
√
1− e−2r ; 7.224, which is considerably different from
E/er ; 9.512.
By the equality er = (n0+10)/
√
(n0 + 1)(n0 + 19), we have n0 = 9e
r/
√
e2r − 1
−10 ; 19.175. Therefore, if −1 < n < 19.175, then ur ; 7.224 + n (Theorem 2.6).
In the case where n = 99 > 19.175, the optimal price ur is determined by
er = exp (
∫
I
log (a(x) + n) dF )/ur. Thus, ur =
√
(n+ 1)(n+ 19)/er ; 103.330,
which is considerably close to E/er ; 103.684, as suggested by Theorem 2.7.
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